The somewhat dis-United Kingdom is leaving the EU. I thought it might be useful to review my columns on Brexit.

By way of background, I do not see any point in writing columns on topics which are well canvassed elsewhere. Rather, I have had two objectives in my columns on Brexit. One is to provide a perspective of the impact of Brexit on New Zealand. The other is to use Brexit to explore wider issues of the global political economy and to illustrate important economic analytical principles.

You will observe that I try to avoid making predictions which will almost certainly prove wrong in a world which is contingent and idiosyncratic. Nor do I see columns as pulpits for promoting my personal views, All my life I have wanted to be a teacher rather than a preacher.

With or Without Britain (December 23, 2014)

I wrote well before the June 2016 referendum

            Suppose Britain exited the European Union of 28 countries. I am not recommending it; they would probably be worse off economically. Nor am I predicting it, although sometimes politics produces odd outcomes. Rather, suppose ‘Brexit’ in order to explore the implications for New Zealand.

            ‘What would New Zealand do? ... We could not go solely with an isolated Britain which would be a third rate world power both economically and politically, not least because some of its business would cross the Channel in order to remain inside the EU.

            ‘Of course we would retain ties of sentiment, ancestral and cultural heritage with Britain and a good number of us have friends and relatives there (although an increasing number have similar connections to other European countries including Ireland). New Zealand would try to straddle both, but if it had to make a choice, it would go with the EU.

Grumbling (April 11, 2016)

Written just over a month before the British referendum on Brexit, this column puzzling about widespread political grumbling, commented:

            In Britain the lightning rod is the referendum on whether Britain should leave the EU (Brexit). ... It is undoubtedly true that some ‘outs’ have very clear views about the sovereignty issue but many more seem to be grumbling about the state of Britain, especially after six years of austerity and the Conservative government still imposing further austerity measures. Prime Minister David Cameron opposes Brexit, so a vote for it is a vote against him and all his policies.

Brexit and Nostalgia (June 19, 2016)

A column in the week before the Brexit referendum gave a chance to write about the broader international issues. I could claim it predicted the ‘leave’ outcome, but I certainly did not expect it.

Angry People (November 11, 2016)

The Brexit Referendum outcome allowed reflection on the wider issue of the alienated Angries who supported Brexit together with the Angries in other democracies. It began with Rudyard Kipling’s bitter couplet, written shortly after the death of his son at Loos in September 1915.

            If any question why we died,

            Tell them, because our fathers lied.

And went on

            But as angry as the couplet is in a military context, it is also about today’s upheavals in domestic politics and its interaction with the international economy. For the basic message of the Angries, supporting Trump, Brexit and a host of similar movements in other countries, is that the elites are lying to them.

Brentry: How New Zealand Coped (February 27, 2017)

This is based on a note that I prepared for a journalist looking for parallels relevant to how Britain might adjust to a Brexit. Its conclusion is that we were much better prepared for Brentry than Britain is for Brexit. It led to the following week’s column.

Brexit: How New Zealand Might Cope (March 5, 2017)

I concluded that while there would be considerable disruption to the world trade negotiations and some particular problems for New Zealand, generally we were no worse off than most third parties.

What This Economist Has Learned From Brexit (July 15, 2018)

The long gap between this and the previous Brexit column did not mean I had lost interest. This column reveals much about being an economist. I don’t think at any stage my understanding of the subject has let me down, but applying the discipline requires a lot of detailed knowledge of the particular circumstances which is accumulated only by a close following of the detail of events. My main learning is summarised as

            The exposing of the intricacies of the British leaving the EU has broadened my understanding of the network of relations which evolve around a trading relationship.

However there are many other learnings and applications in the column. (I add I think that the column portrays Boris Johnson as he was at the time, but it is a different Boris Johnson today; I am guessing the chameleon will be different tomorrow.)

Brexit or Bust? (December 4, 2018)

I used the opportunity of the British Parliament debating the terms for Brexit to illustrate the wider challenges of economic independence and interdependence in terms of the salient issues of freedom of movement and sovereignty.

Analysing The Internal Politics of Brexit (January 29, 2019)

While this column reports on the outcome of the vote on the (Theresa) May-deal in January 2019 (she lost heavily), I used it to illustrate economist Ken Arrow’s analysis which says that when you have multiple issues and multiple (in this case parliamentary) voters it can be damned hard to get a rational decision. I go on to draw its governance implications relating to the role of elected dictatorships in a democracy. (A year later the British Parliament became committed to what, in essence, is the May-deal.)

Waiting for Brexit (March 5, 2019)

Kevin O’Rourke’s A Short History of Brexit is an excellent introduction to the British muddle. One of its strengths is it places the muddle in a centuries-old context, and is particularly strong on the Irish dimension. Add parallels from that wonderful play by another great Irishman, Samuel Beckett, and the temptation to review the book was irresistible.

Is The Left Being Left Behind? (December 22, 2019)

While Brexit was the key issue, this review of Johnson’s successful winning of the British election focused primarily on what it revealed about left politics. Despite more voters backing Remain parties than Leave parties, the composition of the British Parliament backed Brexit, because of the eccentricities of Front Runner (FPP) elections. (The Arrow paradox wins!) While the column’s focus is on the ineptness of the left in Britain and elsewhere, Remainers (who are not exactly the same as the Left) also proved easily out-politicked by the Brexiters.

Reflecting on the Future of Brexit posted February 1, 2029 NZT or January 31 2020 European Standard Time, the witching hour when Britain Brexited.)

Rereading the columns, I am struck that, to my surprise (and relief?), there is very little I would want to rewrite. The major blemish is that I did not get the Angries quite right, for they voted for totally Establishment Boris Johnson ahead of totally anti-Establishment Jeremy Corbyn. I ponder on the paradox.

The Remain politicians proved a pretty ineffectual lot. There is one other group of them which have little involvement in British politics but will prove much more problematic in 2020 – the EU. The European Commission regrets Brexit, but will do its best to support British withdrawal, subject to not otherwise compromising the integrity of the EU. As a result the Brits may find themselves very frustrated by the devil in the detail. The resulting outcome is likely to be disappointing compared to their hopes.

 Given their past record they, and most commentators, are unlikely to understand how the EU will operate. I repeat from the column Waiting For Brexit.

            ... the British tend to think of the European Union as a federation, in which power resides in the European Commission. How else can you explain May’s persistent belief that she can pop over to Brussels for a day and come back with a new deal? Rather it is a confederation, in which power is retained by the member states. The Commission has to consult with the 27 other member states, a good number of whom will raise other issues if the deal changes (e.g. Spain has concerns about Gibraltar).

            Thinking you are in a federation when you are in a confederation confuses your understanding of the nature of sovereignty (another Brexiter failure). Yes, a state loses some sovereignty in a confederation but not as much as in a federation Actually, it loses some sovereignty once it enters into global trade (although not as much as in a confederation).

As I say, I learned much from my monitoring of Brexit. I will continue to do so, but only report in Pundit if I learn something really startling.