The announcement on Monday 27 June that a “Partnership for the Blue Pacific” would be formed is probably good news. This informal grouping, comprising the United States, Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand, is officially intended to respond to Pacific Ocean challenges like “growing pressure on the rules-based free and open international order,” as well as such things as climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic. It follows closely on the heels of the People’s Republic of China signing a defence pact with the Solomon Islands, which Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern was concerned could lead to an increased militarisation of the Pacific.
White House statements said that Pacific Islands’ guidance would be sought on the Partnership’s priorities and flagship projects.
There should be absolutely no confusion as to the reasons why the partnership was established. The response to the recent signing of the security pact between the Solomon Islands and China did not show close allies such as the United States, Australia, and New Zealand as being ready and responsive to Pacific Island needs. All around the world, China is expanding and using its economic power in the service of its national aims. We should remember, however, that this is only what the United Kingdom, France, and the United States have been doing in this region since the time of explorers James Cook and Jules Dumont d'Urville, from 1769.
The problem with this partnership is that it can easily be perceived as established, developed countries ‘talking down’ to our valued smaller Pacific neighbours. Western states can act in this fashion when they believe their security interests may be coming under threat. For fourteen years, I have studied various forms of Western expeditions to build partner indigenous armies, some beside critical sea trade routes, such as Somalia, or in states of key importance such as Afghanistan.
I have seen the process up close in Liberia, Kenya/Somalia, and in Timor-Leste. Often in these places Western national strategic interests, such as the flow of shipping around the Horn of Africa, are placed above the interests of the local population. Patron-client relationships often form. These can see presidents installed which are pulled in two directions between their people and major foreign powers.
A good example was President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan, dependent on American troops for security but often criticising their excesses. Major powers such as China, Russia, and the United States often prioritise their worldwide, often near-imperial, interests over the welfare of indigenous peoples. The result can be failed policy, sparking things like the worldwide uproar over the appalling treatment of the Uyghur minority in far western China. In culturally very different countries, the foreign imprint has a hard time sticking.
Part of the problem is that while “local ownership” has been endlessly talked about in my field, in the face of Western national strategic interest, local priorities are often overridden. Smaller states often really are not placed in the driving seat.
But such lofty views are really not where New Zealand comes from. Auckland is the largest Pacific Island city in the world. We have deep, deep ties with a variety of the Pacific Islands. We share sporting excellence, including many famous All Blacks, cultural and economic ties, and Maori founding stories. For decades our Air Force has spanned the ocean, flying search and rescue missions. New Zealand is a small player in a large region. We would hope to see the people of the Pacific Islands economically well-off, with a guaranteed, secure future. Any larger countries would ideally only be there to be called on for help, as the Pacific Island states need, on Pacific Island states’ terms.
Climate change and rising waters will make this difficult enough; restricting the members of the new partnership to developed Western states will only make matters potentially worse.
If New Zealand and its Government really sees itself as a true and genuine partner on near-equal terms with the Pacific Island states, we need to walk the walk, as well as talk the talk. Bringing Pacific Island states into the new group might slow matters down and potentially divert attention from White House priorities. But that is only the price of a genuine level of friendship and a relationship of mutual respect. The initial White House statement talked of “lines of effort.”
The absolutely most vital line of effort is to ensure that Pacific Island states feel respected and that their wishes are being genuinely considered. A good start to doing that would be to bring one, or even two, Pacific Island states into the new grouping without undue delay.
As an alternative, the Secretary-General of the PIF could be permanently invited to sit in on discussions.